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I. INTRODUCTION
"Poor Joshua."' Perhaps no other two words more clearly enunci-
ate the value of May It Please the Court, a collection of audiotapes of
oral arguments before the United States Supreme Court. The words are
those of Justice Harry A. Blackmun. He uttered them during argument
on DeShaney v. Winnebago Country Department of Social Services,2 a
case in which a boy's guardian sued the local social services agency
for failing to protect the boy from an abusive father who eventually
beat Joshua so badly that he is now severely brain-damaged.3
Blackmun's lament came not in response to an argument on any legal
issue, but as a response to a case in which the facts are so thoroughly
lamentable that they transcend the intricacies of the substantive due
process arguments the Court sat to resolve.
The Court eventually concluded that the department of social
services had no affirmative constitutional duty to protect little Joshua
DeShaney,4 and Justice Blackmun again referred to "Poor Joshua" in
his dissent. The written words are eloquent and forceful; the spoken
1. PETER IRONS & STEPHANIE GuiTTON, MAY IT PLEASE THE COURT: TRANSCRIPTS
OF 23 LIVE RECORDINGS OF LANDMARK CASES As ARGUED BEFORE THE SUPREME COURT
46 (1993) [accompanying book of transcripts] [hereinafter "BOOK"] (all references to the
transcript book also refer to the accompanying tapes).
2. 489 U.S. 189 (1989).
3. Id. at 189.
4. Id. at 202 (per Rehnquist, C.J.).
5. 489 U.S. at 213 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). Justice Blackmun wrote:
Poor Joshua! Victim of repeated attacks by an irresponsible, bullying, cowardly,
and intemperate father, and abandoned by respondents who placed him in a dan-
gerous predicament and who knew or learned what was going on, and yet did
essentially nothing except, as the Court revealingly observes, "dutifully recorded
these incidents in [their] files." It is a sad commentary upon American life, and
constitutional principles-so full of late of patriotic fervor and proud proclamations
about "liberty and justice for all"--that this child, Joshua DeShaney, now is as-
signed to live out the remainder of his life profoundly retarded.
Professor Ann Althouse cites Blackmun's dissent in DeShaney as a rare display of judicial
emotion. Ann Althouse, Essay: Standing, In Fluffy Slippers, 77 VA. L. REV. 1177, 1196-97
(1991) ("[E]veryone who reads the DeShaney case . . . remembers Justice Blackmun's ex-
clamation "Poor Joshua!"). To be fair, Chief Justice William Rehnquist, in his majority
opinion, describes the facts as "undeniably tragic." DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 191.
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2
West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 96, Iss. 2 [1994], Art. 11
https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol96/iss2/11
LEX, LIES, AND AUDIOTAPE
words are human and poignant. It is in this ability to infuse constitu-
tional law with the human considerations underlying individual cases
that May It Please the Court is most successful. It is in its occasional
inattention to detail and its sometimes superficial treatment of the most
significant cases of the last 35 years that the collection is least suc-
cessful.
May It Please the Court suffers in another respect. Professor
Irons, et al, initially aimed their project toward high school and col-
lege students.6 The product, however, has been marketed to a much
broader audience.7 While laymen, students, academicians, and attor-
neys could all find something of interest in these tapes, they may all
ultimately be disappointed-the layman because of impenetrable and
often poorly explained constitutional doctrine and the legally educated
person because of the scant treatment given to cases deserving of
closer scrutiny.
I. COMPILATION OF THE TAPFS
In 1955, then-Chief Justice Earl Warren initiated the practice of
taping oral arguments.! The Court began turning the tapes over to the
National Archives in 19 6 9 ,9 where they would be available for use by
researchers who were willing to sign an agreement that they would use
the tapes "for private research and teaching purposes only."
10
6. Telephone Interview with Peter Irons (Oct. 6, 1993) [hereinafter "Irons Interview"].
7. Indeed, as I wrote this essay, the Fall/Winter 1993 edition of the Wireless cata-
logue arrived in the mail. On page 8, I learned that I could purchase MAY IT PLEASE THE
COURT for only $75. In August, 1993, the History Book Club advertised the collection
along with Kermit Hall's THE OXFORD COMPANION TO THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNIT-
ED STATES as a package deal for just $59.95, trumpeting the pair as "SUPREME SAV-
INGS!"
8. Kevin J. Hamilton, The Court Tapes-Publication of Tapes of Famous Arguments
Before the Supreme Court Has Stirred Legal Criticism and Has the Justices in a Snit, THE
SEATTLE TIMES, Sept. 3, 1993, at Fl.
9. Id.
10. Joan Biskupic, Marketer of Court Tapes Risks Supreme Censure; Oral Arguments
of Famous Cases Were Reproduced Despite Agreement With National Archives, WASH.
POST, Aug. 30, 1993, at A6.
1993-94]
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At the time May It Please the Court was published, newspapers
reported that the use restriction was promulgated in 1986 by then-
Chief Justice 'Warren Burger, who was allegedly upset by a nationally
televised news report on the Pentagon Papers case"' that included bits
of the Court's tape of the oral argument. 12 That tape was included in
a report on The CBS Evening News prepared by then-CBS law corre-
spondent Fred Graham.13 In 1981, Graham was preparing both radio
and television reports to mark the tenth anniversary of the Pentagon
Papers case, and he located a bootleg copy of the oral argument
tape. 14 He used the tape in his reports, assuming that its broadcast
would encourage the Court to allow greater access to the tapes.' 5 He
was mistaken:
The chief went into orbit. Burger blamed the National Archives for the
leak; nothing so wicked had happened so long as the recordings had been
kept within the Court. After an unsuccessful hunt for the leaker, Burger
decreed that no more recordings would go to the Archives-and for the
next five years, none went.' 6
In 1986, the Court resumed sending the tapes to the Archives. 7
However, while much of the press has reported that the use restriction
first appeared at that time, Court public information officer Toni House
claims that, in fact, the 1986 policy was a "liberalization."'' 8 While
earlier requests to copy the tapes had to be presented to the marshal of
the Supreme Court for approval, the 1986 policy required only that
researchers sign the agreement at issue in the Irons case.' 9
11. New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971).
12. Linda P. Campbell, Irate Supreme Court tries to block cassettes, CHIC. TRIBUNE,
Aug. 20, 1993, at 2. See infra notes 13-19.
13. FRED GRAHAM, HAPPY TALK: CONFESSIONS OF A TV NEwSMAN (1990).
14. Id. at 95-96.
15. Id. at 96.
16. Id. at 96.
17. Campbell, supra note 12.
18. Telephone Interview with Toni House, public information officer, the Supreme
Court of the United States (Oct. 6, 1993) [hereinafter "House Interview of Oct. 6, 1993"].
19. Id. Certainly, it is questionable whether the change was a "liberalization." In reali-
ty, it replaced one unreasonable restriction with another. Irons calls House's description of
the history of the use restriction "ridiculous," claiming that there were no restrictions before
1986 in keeping with the original intent of Chief Justice Warren. Irons Interview, supra
[Vol. 96:449
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Irons learned of the tapes and, in 1990, began the project that led
to May It Please the Court.20 Before copying the tapes at the Ar-
chives, he signed the agreement limiting the ways in which he could
use the copies. 21 Irons now argues that he signed the agreement,
knowing he would "technically" breach its terms, because it is unen-
forceable and the greater good he sought was worth a broken prom-
ise.22 Indeed, Irons points to a November 1991 letter he received
from the Chief Justice's administrative assistant, Robb Jones, in which
Jones wrote, "I applaud the concept and your efforts. I know they will
contribute to educators' and the public's understanding of the court's
role and the function of oral argument. ' 23 Reaction from the Court
was not always so ambiguous. In April 1991, Supreme Court Marshal
Alfred Wong wrote to Irons, citing the Archives agreement and argu-
ing against widespread reproduction of the tapes.24 On August 3,
1993, the Court's public information officer, Toni House, issued a
statement to the press:
In order to copy tape recordings of oral arguments before the Supreme
Court of the United States, researchers in the National Archives must sign
an agreement limiting their use of the tapes .... Professor Irons signed
such an agreement for every oral argument he copied at the National Ar-
chives and now features in the product he is selling to the public .... In
note 6. As the issue is largely tangential, I shall simply note the disagreement but not at-
tempt to resolve it.
20. Biskupic, supra note 10.
21. Biskupic, supra note 10.
22. Irons Interview, supra note 6. Irons argues that the agreement violates the First
Amendment as a prior restraint. Id. It is with considerable irony that I listened to the tapes,
hearing at the end of each side a woman's voice explaining that MAY IT PLEASE THE
COURT tapes should not be duplicated or broadcast. Professor Irons explains that he did not
authorize placement of the warning and that it was done in post-production without his
knowledge. Id.
23. Biskupic, supra note 10. The Supreme Court's public information officer, Toni
House, explains that, at the time he wrote the letter, Jones was new to his job and unaware
of the limitation on dissemination of the tapes. Telephone Interview with Toni House, Pub-
lic Information Office, the United States Supreme Court (September 29, 1993) [hereinafter
House Interview of Sept. 29, 1993]. House describes the good wishes as the sort of gratu-
itous conclusion that letter writers often include without meaning to endorse a particular
course of action. Id.
24. Tony Mauro, May It Displease The Court, CONN. L. TRm., Aug. 23, 1993, at 24.
1993-94]
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light of this clear violation of Professor Irons' contractual commitments,
the Court is considering what legal remedies may be appropriate.
25
On August 31, 1993, Marshal Wong notified the National Archives
that future copying requests by Professor Irons should be denied.26
On November 1, 1993, however, the Court backed away from the
controversy and the restrictions-although .without explanation. Marshal
Wong instructed the National Archives that it could henceforth provide
the public with copies of oral argument tapes without restriction.
III. REVIEW OF CASES
The producers of May It Please the Court excerpted portions of
23 oral arguments and, make no mistake about it, the arguments are
truncated.28 This is scholarship in the age of the soundbite-quick,
dramatic, and, all too often, disjointed. The cases arise largely from
the protections of the Bill of Rights, including the First Amend-
ment,29 the Fourth Amendment," the Fifth Amendment,3 the Sixth
25. Statement of the Public Information Office of the Supreme Court of the United
States, Aug. 3, 1993 (copy on file with The West Virginia Law Review).
26. Letter from Alfred Wong to Trudy Peterson, Acting Archivist of the United States,
Aug. 31, 1993 (copy on file with The West Virginia Law Review).
27. Linda Greenhouse, Supreme Court Eases Restrictions on Use of Tapes of Its Argu-
ments, N.Y. TIMEs, November 3, 1993, at A22.
28. The total running time of all 23 arguments is less than nine hours. Hence, the
average time allotted to a case is about 23 minutes. With Professor Irons' extensive intro-
ductions and conclusions, the average is probably less than 20 minutes.
29. ,Abington School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963) (Bible reading in public
school); Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578 (1987) (teaching of creationism in public
school); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972) (mandatory public school attendance in
contravention of religious beliefs); Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536 (1965) (freedom of as-
sembly and speech); Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Comm. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969)
(freedom of expression in schools); Communist Party of the United States v. Subversive
Activities Control Board, 351 U.S. 115 (1956) (freedom of association); Texas v. Johnson,
491 U.S. 397 (1989) (flag burning as expressive conduct); and New York Times Co. v.
United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971) (Pentagon Papers and prior restraint).
30. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968) (stop and frisk).
31. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966) (right to counsel before questioning).
[Vol. 96:449
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Amendment, 32  the Eighth Amendment, 33  the Fourteenth
Amendment,34  and the "penumbral '"3  right of privacy. 6 Two cases
involve the body of the Constitution, specifically the separation of
powers issue involved in executive privilege3 7 and the Commerce
Clause justification for the application of the Civil Rights Act of
196438 to private actors.39 The producers have chosen a wide range
of cases implicating a great many of the significant issues of the latter
half of the Twentieth Century.
Before describing the treatment given specific cases, it is worth-
while to make a few general observations. First, Professor Irons, a
well-known and self-proclaimed "bleeding heart liberal," 40 makes little
effort to mask his political leanings. The transcript book is dedicated
to former Associate Justices William Brennan and Thurgood Marshall.
The descriptions of cases in Irons' narration reflect, sometimes subtly,
his bias.41
32. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963) (right to counsel in criminal trial).
33. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976) (death penalty).
34. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962) (voting apportionment); DeShaney v.
Winnebago County Department of Social Services, 489 U.S. 189 (1989) (affirmative duty to
protect); Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1 (1958) (equal protection in education); Loving v.
Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967) (equal protection for interracial marriage); Palmer v. Thompson,
403 U.S. 217 (1971) (equal protection in city pool closing); Regents of the University of
California v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978) (affirmative action); and San Antonio Sch. Dist.
v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973) (poverty as a suspect class).
35. In Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965), the Court spoke of a penumbra
of unenumerated rights emanating from the Bill of Rights.
36. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (abortion); Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186
(1986) (sodomy).
37. United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974).
38. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000(e)-i to -17 (1988 & Supp. 1991).
39. Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964) (constitutional-
ity of Civil Rights Act of 1964).
40. Tony Perry, It Doesn't Please The Court, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 29, 1993, at A3.
41. In his conclusion to the excerpt from Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967), Irons
explains that "[tihanks to the Supreme Court, Peggy [the Loving's daughter] and her family
don't have to worry about Sheriff Brooks any more." BOOK, supra note 1, at 286. While
the sentiment is one with which most agree, the producers should have resisted the tempta-
tion to editorialize. Similarly, in his conclusion to the segment of Miranda, Irons describes
the subsequent treatment by the Court of the Miranda rule and opines that "[o]ver the past
quarter-century, police officers have learned to live with the Bill of Rights." BOOK, supra
note I, at 222.
1993-94]
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Any liberal perspective evident in May It Please the Court is
simply inappropriate-not because the liberal attorneys, Justices, and
decisions are wrong, but because this product purports to be an educa-
tional tool.42 As such, the producers had a duty to avoid tainting the
work with their ideology. Impressionable listeners should be left to
draw their own conclusions.
Second, May It Please the Court has some unfortunate errors of
detail. For example, in the edited tape and accompanying transcription
of the argument in Gideon v. Wainwright,43 we find the following ex-
change:
Narrator: Justice Stewart repeated the question he asked Lee Rankin.
Justice Thurgood Marshall joined in.
Stewart: Wouldn't Gideon maybe get in trouble for practicing law without
a license? (laughter)
Marshall: With the local bar association."
Gideon was argued and decided in 1963; Justice Marshall joined
the Court in 1967.45 I grant that it is often difficult to discern which
Justice is speaking (especially given that Court transcripts do not name
the speaker but indicate only that a question or comment has come
from the "Court" 46), but Thurgood Marshall's voice was among the
most readily identifiable on the tapes and, moreover, the authors in-
cluded a list of when the various Justices joined the Court that cor-
rectly notes the year of Marshall's appointment. 47
There are, however, high points in May It Please the Court. The
taping of arguments began a year after the Court heard and decided
42. Irons Interview, supra note 6. See also Mauro, supra note 24. Irons insisted that
his project was intended to serve "the public interest." Irons Interview, supra note 6. One
of his major goals was to provide the tapes for teachers and law professors. After a test in
San Diego area high schools, "[tjhe teachers went wild over it. For the first time, they
could teach about these big cases and let their classes hear them beside." Id.
43. 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
44. BOOK, supra note I, at 191-92.
45. BOOK, supra note 1, at 376.
46. House Interiew of Oct. 6, 1993, supra note 18.
47. Irons admits that there are errors, saying "mea culpa." He claims, though, that
there are relatively few errors for so large a work. Irons Interview, supra note 6.
[Vol. 96:449
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Brown v. Board of Education,48 arguably Thurgood Marshall's best
moment as an advocate, and so that argument could not, of course, be
included. However, the producers of May It Please the Court included
argument from Cooper v. Aaron,49 a school desegregation case that
came in the wake of Brown. Thurgood Marshall represented the par-
ents of the black children of Little Rock by stating:
And therefore, I am not worried about the Negro children at this stage. I
don't believe they're in this case as such. I worry about the white children
in Little Rock who are told, as young people, that the way to get your
rights is to violate the law and defy the lawful authorities. I'm worried
about their future. I don't worry about those Negro kids' future. They've
been struggling with democracy long enough. They know about it."
The argument in Cooper is filled with historical context: Thurgood
Marshall worrying about Little Rock's white children; Richard Butler,
counsel for the school board, arguing that integration would lead to
mob violence and ultimately destroy the schools.51
Nine years later, Marshall joined the Court. In the oral argument
in United States v. Nixon,52 we hear Justice Marshall questioning
President Nixon's attorney, James St. Clair, regarding a fundamental
question of separation of powers: if the Court ordered the President to
turn over the oval office tapes to the special prosecutor, would the
President comply?
Marshall: You're still leaving it up to this Court to decide it?
St. Clair: Well, yes, in a sense.
Marshall: Well, in what sense?
St. Clair: In the sense that this court has an obligation to determine the
law. All right? The president also has an obligation to carry out his consti-
tutional functions.
Marshall: Well, do you agree that that's what's before this Court, and
you're submitting it to this Court for decision?
48. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
49. 358 U.S. 1 (1958).
50. BOOK, supra note 1, at 254.
51. BOOK, supra note 1, at 253.
52. 418 U.S. 683 (1974).
1993-94]
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St. Clair: This is being submitted to this Court for its guidance and judg-
ment with respect to the law. The president, on the other hand, has his
obligations under the Constitution. 3
Because of the 20 years that have passed since Watergate was front-
page news, it is easy to forget some of the drama of those days; the
exchange between Marshall and St. Clair is a vivid reminder of just
how basic and important the issues were.54
There are other worthwhile snapshots in May It Please the Court:
a misguided attempt at humor in the argument on Roe v. Wade,55 the
unexpected concession of Yale's Alexander Bickel in arguing on behalf
of The New York Times in the Pentagon Papers case,56 and the prob-
ing interrogation of counsel by Justice Antonin Scalia in Texas v.
Johnson,57 among others.
53. BOOK, supra note 1, at 29-30.
54. Indeed, in the end, the Supreme Court unanimously ruled against Nixon and re-
quired him to divulge the tapes to the special prosecutor. United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S.
at 714. Nixon resigned less than a month later.
55. In beginning his argument, Texas assistant attorney general Jay Floyd regarded his
opposing counsel, Sarah Weddington, and her co-counsel and began: "Mr. Chief Justice,
may it please the Court. It's an old joke, but when a man argues against two beautiful
ladies like this, they're going to have the last word. BOOK, supra note 1, at 346. The
"joke" fell flat; no one laughed. Id. at 347.
56. Bickel argued that the government's attempt at prior restraint violated the First
Amendment. Justice Potter Stewart offered a hypothetical:
Stewart: Let us assume that when the members of the Court go back and open up
this sealed record, we find something there that absolutely convinces us that its
disclosure would result in the sentencing to death of a hundred young men whose
only offense has been that they were nineteen years old and had low draft num-
bers. What should we do? ...You would say the Constitution requires that it be
published and that these men die, is that it?
Bickel: No. No, I'm afraid I'd have, I'm afraid that my, the inclinations of hu-
manity overcome the somewhat more abstract devotion to the First Amendment, in
a case of that sort.
BOOK, supra note 1, at 173.
57. Kathi Alyce Drew, counsel for the State of Texas in the 1989 flag burning case,
argued that the state had a number of compelling interests in preventing flag desecration,
including preserving the flag as a national symbol.
Scalia: Why does the-why did the defendant's actions here destroy the symbol?
His actions would have been useless unless the flag was a very good symbol for
what he intended to show contempt for. His action does not make it any less a
symbol.
[Vol. 96:449
10
West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 96, Iss. 2 [1994], Art. 11
https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol96/iss2/11
LEX, LIES, AND AUDIOTAPE
IV. THE SUPREME COURT AND SECRECY
A. The Brethren
While the Court remains "a riddle wrapped in a mystery inside an
enigma,''58 May It Please the Court is not the first breach of the
Court's sanctum sanctorum. In 1979, Bob Woodward and Scott
Armstrong published The Brethren: Inside The Supreme Court, a de-
tailed description of the cases, deliberations, politics, and personalities
of the Court for the seven terms beginning in October, 1969.'9
The Brethren offers a fascinating glimpse of the personalities of
various members of the Court, including their willingness to change
their votes in order to increase their own prestige or in order to retain
the power to assign which Justice would write the majority opinion.6
Woodward and Armstrong's primary sources for The Brethren
were the Justices' law clerks, a fact made evident in the text. If it is
true that the history of war is skewed because it is written by the win-
ners, it is equally true that this history of the Supreme Court is
skewed because it relies so heartily upon the recollections of the law
Drew: Your honor, we believe that if a symbol over a period of time is ignored
or abused that it can, in fact, lose its symbolic effect.
Scalia: I think not at all . . . . I mean, it seems to me you're running quite a
different argument-not that he's destroying its symbolic character, but that he is
showing disrespect for it, that you not just want a symbol, but you want a vener-
ated symbol, and you don't make that argument because then you're getting into a
sort of content preference. I don't see how you can argue that he's making it any
less of a symbol than it was.
BOOK, supra note 1, at 153. The tapes reveal Scalia to be a careful interrogator, rather like
Justice Felix Frankfurter, another former law professor. See Melvin I. Urofsky, John Mar-
shall and All That, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 26, 1993, at 33.
58. In 1939, British Prime Minister Winston Churchill called the Soviet Union "a
riddle wrapped in a mystery inside an enigma." See Herbert Mitgang, Books of the Times;
A Reporter at the Creation of the New Russia, N.Y. TIMES, May 26, 1993, at C17.
59. BOB WOODWARD & ScoTT ARMSTRONG, THE BRETHREN: INSIDE THE SUPREME
COURT (1979).
60. Id. at 66-67.
1993-94]
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clerks.61 The law clerks are the heroes of The Brethren.62 The book
is brimming with stories of indecisive Justices being swayed by their
law clerks,63 of law clerks gathering in ersatz conferences to really
decide cases, 64 and of law clerks taking principled stances on issues
when their Justices would not.65
While The Brethren provides a compelling inside look at the Su-
preme Court, it also represents a remarkable breach of confidentiality
by Court staff. Like practicing attorneys, law clerks have a duty of
confidentiality to their clients-the judges and Justices they serve.66
There is a purpose for this confidentiality. A law clerk is a judge's
assistant and confidante; indeed, Judge Patricia Wald of the United
States Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit has written that "[t]he
judge-clerk relationship is the most intense and mutually dependent one
I know of outside of marriage, parenthood, or a love affair., 67 As
61. Law clerks tend to have strong opinions about the cases on which they assist
their judges or Justices and can occasionally forget the two things standing between them
and the black robe: nomination by the President and confirmation by the Senate. See
Randall Kennedy, Fanfare for an Uncommon Man, TIME, Feb. 8, 1993, at 32 (former law
clerk to Justice Thurgood Marshall recalling the Justice reminding law clerks: "I'm the one
who was nominated by President Lyndon B. Johnson and confirmed by the Senate of the
United States . . . not you.").
62. See Floyd Abrams, Trivializing the Supreme Court, FORTUNE, Mar. 10, 1980, at
129 (criticizing THE BRETHREN's focus on law clerks). Another critic of THE BRETHREN
wrote: "Mhe clerks, as presented in The Brethren-in other words, the clerks as they al-
lowed themselves to be quoted and described-come through as presumptuous and arrogant."
George Anastaplo, Comment, Legal Realism, The New Journalism, and The Brethren, 1983
DUKE L.J. 1045, 1062.
63. WOODWARD & ARMSTRONG, supra note 59, at 375-76 (describing Justice Potter
Stewart's clerks influencing his decision in O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563 (1975)).
64. WOODWARD & ARMSTRONG, supra note 59, at 180 (describing meeting between
clerks of Justice Byron White and Justice Thurgood Marshall in which White's clerk sug-
gested he could "deliver" his Justice's vote in a crucial case).
65. WOODWARD & ARMSTRONG, supra note 59, at 138 n.* (indicating that a concur-
rence by Justice William o. Douglas retained language that showed it had originally been a
dissent because Douglas' clerk refused to work on it after the Justice would not remove an
incorrect reference to Black Muslims).
66. See Anastaplo, supra note 62, at 1058; see also, CODE OF CONDUCT FOR LAW
CLERKS OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS Canon 3(C) (1981) ('The relationship between
judge and law clerk is essentially a confidential one . . . . A law clerk should never dis-
close to any person any confidential information received in the course of the law clerk's
duties .... ").
67. Patricia M. Wald, Essay: Selecting Law Clerks, 89 MICH. L. REV. 152, 153
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they go about their deliberations, judges must know that they can con-
fide in their law clerks.6" Indeed, it is likely that publication of The
Brethren caused some Justices and judges to reevaluate how much they
would divulge to their law clerks.
There is a critical distinction between The Brethren and May It
Please the Court, one that points up the untenable position of the
Court in denying greater public access to oral argument. The authors
of The Brethren invaded activities of the Court that are secret by
tradition and for good purpose. Discussions between Justices and their
law clerks and among the Justices at their private conferences are
closed to the public. The oral arguments reproduced in May It Please
the Court are open to the public, although space constraints in the
courtroom limit seating and often allow visitors only a very few
minutes' seating.69 Thus, wide dissemination of the argument tapes is
a difference of degree rather than of real substance, a fact apparently
now recognized by the Court in allowing the Archives to release the
tapes without restriction.
B. Justice Marshall's Notes
The 1993 death of former Justice Thurgood Marshall brought
about a breach of the Court's "privacy" similar to that of The Breth-
ren. Marshall had given his papers and notes to the Library of Con-
gress and the Library interpreted the donation to allow public access to
the documents shortly after Marshall's death.70 The collection includes
173,700 documents-among them memoranda from all members of the
Court, communications with law clerks, and drafts of opinions. 71 The
Court and, interestingly, Justice Marshall's family argued to no avail
(1989).
68. See generally Alex Kozinski, Essay, Confessions of a Bad Apple, 100 YALE L. J.
1707 (1991).
69. Joan Biskupic, The Court Is Back, With a 'New' Look, WASH. POST, Oct. 5,
1992, at A17.
70. Neil A. Lewis, Rare Glimpses of Judicial Chess and Poker, N.Y. TIMES, May 25,
1993, at Al.
71. Id.
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that the release of the papers violated Court confidentiality and misin-
terpreted Marshall's intent.72
Like The Brethren, the release of Marshall's notes and papers
represents a significant intrusion into the deliberations of members of
the Court. The discussions and communications revealed by the Library
of Congress are confidential of necessity and reveal details about cases
from as recent as Marshall's last term on the bench.7 3 Coming just
six months before the May It Please the Court controversy, the, Mar-
shall document release may help to explain the Court's exaggerated
reaction to the distribution of the oral argument tapes. Still, an exami-
nation of May It Please the Court, The Brethren, and the Marshall
papers only serves to highlight the distinction between the public pro-
ceedings of the Court and the private ones.
C. Removing the Shroud
1. Irons' Method of Acquisition
Before discussing in any further detail the central theme of this
essay, I must address a threshhold issue. Professor Irons' actions in
signing the Archives' agreement and then knowingly violating it was
deceitful and unethical. A person who claims such high causes as edu-
cating the masses about the majesty of the law should not begin his
effort by lying-and, make no mistake about it, Peter Irons lied when
he signed the Archives' agreement because he fully intended to break
it.74 Assuming that the tapes should be given wider dissemination,
there were better-and more honest-ways to do it. Certainly, Irons
could have made an appeal to the Court or to the Archives, which he
72. Id. Chief Justice Rehnquist may have had another reason. The collection apparent-
ly includes a draft of an opinion written by Rehnquist and circulated to Marshall; Marshall
critiqued it succinctly: "Unadulterated BS!" See Lionel Van Deerlin, A little light on the
black robes and black moods, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIB., Sept. 3, 1993, at B5.
73. Id.
74. Irons told one reporter that he believed his educational goals were not in conflict
with the agreement he signed. Mauro, supra note 24. The comment is difficult to compre-
hend as the agreement also explicitly forbids reproduction of the tapes-something Irons
intended to do from the inception of his project.
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admits he did not do. "It would be an exercise in futility," he ex-
plains.75 Although there are times when civil disobedience is laud-
able-witness the Montgomery bus boycott-this is not one of those
times.
2. Arguments Against Dissemination
The Court has now settled the tapes issue in favor of allowing
greater access. There remains, however, the issue of allowing broadcast
coverage of the Court's proceedings. The tapes will be released pub-
licly several weeks after the oral arguments;76 thus, they will be of
limited use to reporters and others who have immediate need for ac-
cess to the arguments. In the context of the tapes debate, two argu-
ments have been offered against wide dissemination of the tapes that
apply with equal vigor to broadcast coverage of the Court. The Court's
public information officer, Toni House, suggests that the Justices might
be concerned that the broadcast media would reduce complex argu-
ments to unintelligible and unflattering soundbites.77 Judge Alex
Kozinski of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit argues
that "[o]ral arguments are high pressure situations, for both the judges
and the lawyers .... Judges may be hesitant to ask questions if they
know that every stutter will be on the evening news. 78
Neither rationale has merit. While there is an unfortunate tendency
on television and radio to reduce the world to soundbites, there is no
less a proclivity for newspaper reporters and editors to extract compel-
ling and dramatic quotes. Print reporters, of course, are allowed to take
75. Irons Interview, supra note 6. Irons asks if he was ethically required to expend
thousands of dollars in litigation expenses only to inevitably be told "no." Id. The answer is
"yes," particularly because Irons himself is receiving royalties for the project (the promotion-
al materials depict this as a non-profit enterprise. The New Press is non-profit, but Peter
Irons' participation is not). Id. Economists often speak of "opportunity costs." Indeed, as of
early October 1993, the product was in its fifth printing, having sold more than 60,000 cop-
ies nationwide. Tony Mauro, Ginsburg's Second Welcome-Without Cameras, Of Course,
TEx. LAWYER, Oct. 4, 1993, at 24.
76. Tony Perry, Curbs on Use of High Court Tapes Lifted, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 3, 1993,
at A36.
77. House Interview of Sept. 29, 1993, supra note 23.
78. Hamilton, supra note 8.
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notes at oral argument.79 Indeed, the Court has itself recognized that,
79. The different treatment afforded the different media may have something to do
with the perceived intrusiveness of radio and television equipment. This is a false distinc-
tion. Technology is such that cameras and microphones could be installed in the courtroom
so that no one present would even be aware of them (indeed, Professor Irons reports that
several of the attorneys heard arguing before the Court in MAY IT PLEASE THE COURT were
unaware that they were being taped. See Mauro, supra note 24). The Court is aware of the
potential for unobtrusive coverage. In 1988, Washington, D.C., attorney Timothy Dyk, repre-
senting 13 media organizations, offered a demonstration of broadcast technology in the
courtroom-with Chief Justice William Rehnquist and Associate Justice Anthony Kennedy
present.
The simulation used the existing courtroom lighting and audio system and it
employed two small cameras-one tucked into an alcove to focus on the Justices
and the second placed under the Justices' bench to focus on the podium from
which lawyers argue their cases.
The Justices reportedly asked about lighting, editing, and the anticipated
amount of exposure the Court's arguments would receive. In response, they were
told that C-SPAN had committed itself to broadcast all 150 oral arguments in full,
and that commercial news organizations might cover twelve to fifteen hearings per
year.
Late the following year, however, Chief Justice Rehnquist informed Mr. Dyk
that the Court declined to change its policy against broadcast coverage.
Todd Piccus, Demystifying the Least Understood Branch: Opening the Supreme Court to
Broadcast Media, 71 TEx. L. REv. 1053, 1056-57 (1993), citing Cameras in the Supreme
Court: A Dry-Run for the Justices, BROADCASTING, Nov. 28, 1988, at 57; and Eleanor
Randolph, Justices Continue Ban on Courtroom Cameras: Video's Trial Run Proves Unper-
suasive, WASH. POST, Nov. 1, 1989, at A23.
In addition, House's argument also presumes, unrealistically, that producers of broadcast
newscasts-in which video is edited into soundbites-would consider the Supreme Court's
arguments to be frequently newsworthy. Television is a medium that relies heavily on pic-
tures. Seven men and two women sitting at a bench listening to two lawyers discuss often
arcane legal doctrines is rarely the stuff of World News Tonight, NBC Nightly News, or The
CBS Evening News. Outlets such as C-SPAN and Court TV might elect to provide unedited
coverage, in which event the soundbite concern is inapplicable.
Further, regardless of whether cameras make their way into the Supreme Court, the
Court will always be subject to soundbite journalism when the networks choose to cover it.
Broadcast reporters frequently include sketches of Justices in their stories, with portions of
the dialogue "chyroned" on the screen (Chyron is a trade name for a character-generation
system. The word is often used in broadcasting as a generic term for any writing on the
screen).
Indeed, there is ample evidence that Justices realize that their opinions will be digested
in the press. For example, Justice Blackmun, in Webster v. Reproductive Health Services, et
al., 492 U.S. 490 (1989), wrote in dissent: "For today, at least, the law of abortion stands
undisturbed. For today, the women of this Nation still retain the liberty to control their
destinies. But the signs are evident and very ominous, and a chill wind blows." Id. at 560
(Blackmun, J., dissenting).
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in the pursuit of the free press mandated by the First Amendment,
government should not seek to regulate editorial policy.
80
Kozinski's concern about pressure on advocates and Justices is
likewise unfounded. For the lawyers, arguing before the Court is un-
doubtedly traumatic-but it is likely (and desirable) that their concerns
about the merits of their cases would overcome their "stage fright."
Further, it is common for counsel to leave the courtroom and emerge
from the Supreme Court building eagerly to wade into a gaggle of
microphones and cameras. Many, if not most, cases brought before the
Court are matters of considerable public interest; attorneys who argue
have undoubtedly dealt with press coverage long before oral argument.
As for the Justices, if the presence of a camera or a microphone
would make them shy and unable to function properly, we should
wonder whether they should have been nominated in the first place;
pressure is inherent in judging. Indeed, in some respects, it is likely
that television and radio coverage would encourage the Justices to be
more conversant with cases before argument and then to focus more
intently on counsel during argument.8 '
3. Arguments in Favor of Wide Distribution and Broadcast
In many ways, the United States Supreme Court and the subordi-
nate federal courts are behind the times with respect to broadcasting.
Currently, forty-seven states allow broadcast coverage of at least por-
tions of trials in the state courts.8 2 While there has been criticism of
It is altogether likely that Blackmun wrote his concluding paragraph for the press. See,
e.g., David Dahl, Justices allow states to limit some abortions, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, July
4, 1989, at 1A; Ellen Goodman, Abortion: By Pill . . . , WASH. POST, July 29, 1989, at
A17; Ann McDaniel, The Future of Abortion, NEWSWEEK, July 17, 1989, at 14; Parts of
Pennsylvania Abortion Law Ruled Out, ORLANDO SENTINEL TRIB., Aug. 25, 1990, at A3.
80. See Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241, 256 (1974) (noting
that "[a] responsible press is an undoubtedly desirable goal, but press responsibility is not
mandated by the Constitution and like many other virtues it cannot be legislated."). While
the circumstances of Tornillo are significantly distinct from the issue of public distribution
or broadcast of Supreme Court oral arguments, the point remains that the Court has, in the
past, condemned government regulation of editorial content.
81. See Piccus, supra note 79.
82. Piccus, supra note 79, at 1064.
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"cameras in the courtroom," the experiences of those states that have
allowed broadcast access has largely been positive-so much so that
many states have concluded experimental programs and opted to make
permanent allowance for cameras in their courtrooms.8 3 Indeed, al-
though at times grudgingly, many of the lower federal courts have
begun to allow broadcast coverage of proceedings.84
The general success of broadcast coverage of trials makes the
Supreme Court's adamant stance against broadcast of oral arguments
all the more curious. If cameras and microphones were harmful to the
administration of justice, the harm would be more pronounced at the
trial level than at the appellate level. A television camera in a trial
courtroom could, hypothetically, frighten recalcitrant witnesses, distract
bored jurors, or highlight crime victims who would prefer anonymity.
None of these concerns accompanies coverage of oral arguments before
an appellate court. Further, there is a fundamental distinction between
the functions and importance of oral argument and trial. Precise con-
duct of a trial is crucial for it is there that the factual record of a case
is assembled; oral argument is merely a supplement to the already
constructed record and the briefs of counsel.8 5 Thus, if few problems
83. See Action, Cameras in the Federal Courts, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 4, 1990, at A16;
see also, Kent Shuart, One "Yes" Vote for Cameras in the Court, (letter to the editor) THE
RECORDER, Aug. 2, 1993, at 12 (citing California study that showed that cameras in the
courtroom did not disrupt proceedings or affect the performances of witnesses or counsel).
New York Supreme Court Justice Harold Rothwax told a national radio news program that
he now supports media coverage of trials.
Well, originally I was opposed to cameras in the courtroom because I thought
they'd be distracting, and I thought they'd be disruptive. And after presiding over
the [Joel] Steinberg case for about three and a half, four months, I simply found
from my experience that that was not the case-that the lawyers did not play to
the camera, that very quickly the camera simply became part of the furniture,
quite unobtrusive.
All Things Considered (NPR radio broadcast, April 6, 1993).
84. In July, 1991, the United States Judicial Conference began an experiment to test
broadcast coverage. Piccus, supra note 79. Currently, two courts of appeals and six district
courts are participating. Id.
85. Justices Oliver Wendell Holmes and William 0. Douglas thought so little of oral
argument that they would often sit at the bench reading their mail. See Urofsky, supra note
57. That, of course, again brings to light another worthwhile attribute of broadcast coverage
of the Court: Justices would have greater incentive to be well-prepared for oral argument
and less inclination to focus on other activities.
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have attended the presence of broadcast equipment in trial courtrooms,
it is unlikely that similar coverage of Supreme Court argument would
foster problems.8 6
Across Capitol Hill from the Supreme Court building, cameras and
microphones have become commonplace in the chambers and commit-
tee-rooms of Congress. In the last decade and a half, both Houses of
Congress have allowed their proceedings to be broadcast. 87 While the
decision to televise the House of Representatives and the Senate re-
ceived considerable criticism from the start, few would now complain
that the presence of cameras in the chambers has caused any harm.8
Indeed, millions of Americans watch Congress every day on C-SPAN
(covering the House) and C-SPAN II (covering the Senate)-something
unimaginable 20 years ago.89 As with trial courts, it would seem
more likely that broadcast coverage of the Congress would cause trou-
ble than coverage of the Supreme Court; legislators worry about re-
election and might feel inclined to "grandstand" for audiences in their
districts or states. However, there is no indication that broadcast cover-
age has engendered any such problems. 90
86. There is a small body of case law dealing with cameras in the courtroom, but as
those cases are only marginally related to the theme of this essay-public access to tapes
and broadcasts of Supreme Court proceedings-they will not be addressed here. See Estes v.
Texas, 381 U.S. 532 (1965) (reversing a conviction in part because of broadcast coverage
of trial); Chandler v. Florida, 449 U.S. 560, 573 (1981) (holding that "Estes is not to be
read as announcing a constitutional rule barring still photographic, radio, and television
coverage in all cases and under all circumstances."). The Estes Court held that broadcasters
enjoy no First Amendment right of access to courtrooms. 381 U.S. at 539.
87. On March 19, 1979, then-Representative Albert Gore, Jr., made the first live tele-
vised speech on the floor of the House of Representatives. See Michael D. Shear, 10 Years
of C-SPAN Coverage-And the House Still Stands, L.A. TIMEs, April 5, 1989, at 1. Seven
years later, the Senate followed suit. See TV in the Senate: one year later, BROADCASTING,
June 1, 1987.
88. In 1989, Senator John Danforth, originally an opponent of broadcast coverage of
the Senate, admitted that "the playing to the cameras and the galleries that I expected just
didn't occur." Shear, supra note 87. Another initial opponent, Senator Robert Byrd, ex-
plained that "I think it has worked well. Some of the fears that I and others had have not
materialized. I think Senate TV has been a success." BROADCASTING, supra note 87.
89. See Ken Hoover, Legislators ponder televising sessions, UNITED PRESS INT'L, Aug.
27, 1989 (discussing California legislature's consideration of allowing broadcast coverage). In
1988, 22 million Americans regularly watched one or the other C-SPAN channel. Id.
90. See supra note 85 and accompanying text.
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In essence, then, both the courts and the legislatures that have
allowed broadcast coverage initially feared problems but learned that
their concerns were unfounded. Likewise, there is simply no reason to
believe proper functioning of the U.S. Supreme Court would be imper-
iled by similar coverage.91
There is another, rather more ethereal issue: the justice system in
this country-police, lawyers, judges-has become too far removed
from the everyday lives of Americans. 92 This distance is perhaps ac-
countable for problems large and small-from the Los Angeles riots
that followed 1992's state-court acquittal of four police officers ac-
cused of beating Rodney King93 to the long-term poor standing of
lawyers in the eyes of the public.94 In such a time, the nation's high-
est court should seek to make its workings accessible and under-
standable rather than shrouded and cryptic. While oral arguments on
tax, ERISA, 95 antitrust, and other complex areas of the law might be
difficult for many people to follow, arguments on First Amendment
rights, abortion, criminal procedure, and many other issues might be
engrossing (especially if covered in full with educated commentary as
is now done on Court TV). Many Americans might gain a new appre-
ciation for the Constitution and laws of the United States. 6
91. In March, 1993, the Canadian Supreme Court allowed television and radio cover-
age of an argument as part of an experiment to consider whether to permit permanent
broadcast access. David Vienneau, Jury's out on the future of TV in high court, TORONTO
STAR, Mar .3, 1993, at A2. One lawyer told reporters, "I think it will demystify the pro-
cess. I think the more the Canadian public learns about our court process and our court
systems, the better off we'll be." Id. Chief Justice Antonio Lamer explained that the time
was ripe for the experiment in that none of the current nine justices had strong objections.
Id.
92. See Elizabeth Ross, Legal Educators Say Courts Need Demystifying, CHRISTIAN
SCIENCE MON., June 9, 1992, at 12 (citing an American Bar Association survey showing
that a third of all Americans are unaware that the Bill of Rights encompasses the first ten
amendments to the Constitution).
93. See, e.g., Rachel Kretser, The Need for a Representative Judiciary, N.Y.L.J., June
29, 1992, at 2.
94. See Randall Samborn, Tracking Trends, NAT'L L. J., Aug. 9, 1993, at 20 (noting
that, in a 1993 poll, 41 per cent of those surveyed believed lawyers to have "low" or "very
low" honesty and ethical standards).
95. The Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461
(1988 & Supp. 1992).
96. It should be noted that one disadvantage would be that Justices, now largely anon-
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V. CONCLUSION
May It Please the Court, while subject to some well-warranted
criticism, did serve as a lightning rod to attract attention to the archaic
restrictions the Supreme Court has placed on distribution of oral argu-
ment tapes and on broadcast coverage. In that sense, Peter Irons and
his colleagues may have accomplished a great deal, particularly to the
extent that the attention directed to May It Please the Court pushed
the Court to remove the tape distribution restriction. That Irons, et al,
did so in flagrant violation of a signed agreement is unfortunate, but
the deception does serve to highlight the lengths to which the Supreme
Court is willing to go to retain its shroud of secrecy-even for pro-
ceedings that are clearly public. 97
Law is fraught with sometimes unexplainable traditions-the black
robe, the excessive use of Latin, even the opening "May it please the
Court," when what follows very well may not-but at the core, the
Supreme Court derives its authority from the Constitution and the re-
spect of the American people for the laws and the courts, not from the
Court's centuries-old mystique.
ymous in public, would become recognizable. While the invasion of privacy is regrettable,
such is the lot of those who choose to be in the public eye.
97. While the Court clearly considered the publication of MAY IT PLEASE THE COURT
a serious transgression, Court personnel did not lose their senses of humor: public informa-
tion officer Toni House referred callers to the opinion in United States v. Shipp, 215 U.S.
580 (1909). In that case, a Tennessee sheriff and others were cited for contempt by the
Court when they allowed a prisoner whose appeal was pending before the Court to be
lynched. United States v. Shipp, 214 U.S. 386 (1909) (describing the circumstances). On
June 1, 1909, the defendants were called to the bar of the Supreme Court and Chief Justice
Melville Weston Fuller imposed sentences of two months for some and three months for
others. 215 U.S. at 582.
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